Author: Tanay Ved, Senior Researcher at Coin Metrics; Translation: @jinsecaijingxz
Article Summary
While quantum computers do not currently pose a real threat to blockchain encryption systems, recent technological breakthroughs have significantly shortened the window of opportunity for response, pushing the industry into a proactive preparedness phase.
It is estimated that approximately 6.9 million BTC are at risk of quantum computing attacks due to the use of legacy address types and key reuse, of which approximately 1.7 million BTC (9% of the supply) exist in dormant tokens from the Satoshi Nakamoto era and are difficult to migrate.
It is estimated that approximately 6.9 million BTC are at risk of quantum computing attacks due to the use of legacy address types and key reuse, of which approximately 1.7 million BTC (9% of the supply) exist in dormant tokens from the Nakamoto era and are difficult to migrate.
Quantum risks vary depending on the blockchain's address structure, signature scheme, and consensus model. Various ecosystems are actively advancing proposals and post-quantum roadmaps to adopt new signature schemes. The rapid development of quantum computing is transforming what was once a distant theoretical possibility into a concrete challenge for the underlying encryption technology of blockchains. Recent research by Google's quantum AI team shows that the resources and time required to build a quantum computer capable of breaking the elliptic curve cryptography relied upon by Bitcoin and other blockchains are decreasing. Coinbase's Quantum Advisory Committee also points out that although such machines have not yet been created, the window for migrating to quantum-resistant encryption has opened. As this risk becomes increasingly imminent, developers, network participants, investors, and large institutional holders will play a crucial role in guiding the decentralized ecosystem towards a quantum-resistant future. This article will delve into the risks of quantum computing to blockchain encryption, focusing on Bitcoin's exposure, the controversy surrounding dormant tokens, and the current paths Ethereum and Solana are taking towards quantum-resistant preparedness. 2. Understanding the Imminent Quantum Risks Blockchain security relies on cryptographic signatures that are difficult for traditional computers to crack but could be broken by quantum computers. Currently, Bitcoin, Ethereum, and most other networks use elliptic curve signatures (such as ECDSA and BLS) to prove that the private key holder has authorized a transaction. In principle, quantum algorithms such as the Shor algorithm can derive the private key from the corresponding public key, meaning that once such a machine becomes available, any address with an exposed public key could become a target for attack. This risk manifests primarily in two forms, depending on whether the public key has been exposed in the transaction: Static (Long-Term) Attacks: Targeting wallets, validator keys, and contracts whose public keys are publicly visible on the chain. Future quantum computers could deduce private keys and steal funds without the owner making any new moves. Dynamic (Short-Term) Attacks: Attacking transactions within the short window between the public key being exposed through a spending activity and the transaction being confirmed. Fast quantum computers can race against time to sign conflicting transactions before the network. Bitcoin's approximately 10-minute block time creates a longer risk exposure window than faster chains like Ethereum (approximately 12 seconds) or Solana (sub-second finality).
3. Bitcoin's Quantum Risk Exposure
Bitcoin's quantum risk primarily exists at the wallet level, and its level depends on how the UTXO model and address types handle public keys. Each unspent transaction output (UTXO) is locked in a script bound to a public-private key pair. As long as the public key remains hidden, it is difficult for quantum attackers to launch an attack. However, once the key is exposed on-chain, future quantum computers can deduce the private key and forge valid spending.
Therefore, the root of Bitcoin's risk lies in whether the public key has been exposed, and the risk varies depending on the address type and reuse:
P2PK (Pay to Public Key): Includes some of the earliest tokens from the "Satoshi era," tokens from early miners, and tokens from Satoshi Nakamoto himself.
P2PK (Pay to Public Key): Includes tokens from the earliest tokens of the "Satoshi era," tokens from early miners, and tokens from Satoshi Nakamoto himself.
P2TR (Taproot): This type of address improves flexibility and privacy, but by directly embedding the modified public key into the address, it makes future quantum attackers have a visible target from the outset.
The following diagram illustrates the evolution of the adoption of these address types in Bitcoin's history, highlighting the shift from traditional P2PK/P2PKH to Segregated Witness outputs. This shift is gradually moving new tokens to addresses with structurally smaller quantum risk exposure.
P2TR (Taproot): This type of address improves flexibility and privacy, but by directly embedding the modified public key into the address, it makes future quantum attackers have a visible target from the outset.
The following diagram illustrates the evolution of the adoption of these address types in Bitcoin's history, highlighting the shift from traditional P2PK/P2PKH to Segregated Witness outputs. This shift is gradually moving new tokens to addresses with structurally smaller quantum risk exposure.
P2TR (Taproot)

4. How much Bitcoin is at risk?
According to estimates from the quantum computing white paper released by Project Eleven and Google in March, approximately 6.9 million BTC are stored in addresses where public keys have been exposed. These public key exposures include: key leaks caused by using traditional P2PK outputs (whose public keys are publicly visible on-chain from generation) or by address reuse (where the public key is permanently broadcast to the network during consumption).
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We scanned the first 500,000 Bitcoin blocks using the Coin Metrics ATLAS system and confirmed that approximately 2.3 million BTC are stored in high-risk addresses. Of these, approximately 1.7 million are likely from P2PK creation outputs from the Satoshi Nakamoto era and early miner era. The remaining approximately 4.6 million high-risk BTC are mainly distributed in blocks generated after 2017. As the address type adoption trend shows, traditional P2PKH address generation has never completely stopped, and since the introduction of Segregated Witness and Taproot, the reuse of addresses in both old and new formats has increased year by year.
... 5. The Dormant Coin Dilemma The core of the quantum risk debate lies in the fate of Bitcoin dormant coins and those held by Satoshi Nakamoto. Approximately 1.7 million BTC (9% of the total supply) have never circulated since the early stages and are stored in traditional address types where the public keys have been exposed or will be exposed immediately upon use. This asset includes approximately 1.1 million BTC associated with Satoshi Nakamoto, dispersed across approximately 22,000 accounts (each with approximately 50 BTC), rather than a single wallet. These "Satoshi-era" tokens pose a unique challenge. Because this portion of the supply cannot actively participate in migration, deciding whether and how to protect them has become one of the most contentious coordination problems in Bitcoin. Community-proposed solutions encompass a variety of interventions, including maintaining the status quo (no intervention), freezing assets, burning tokens, or rate limiting spending. The risks faced by these dormant coin assets are not evenly distributed. As shown in the figure below, the majority of them exist in the P2PK creation output (approximately 1.7 million BTC, distributed across 34,000 addresses), and from a quantum computing perspective, these assets have the highest exposure risk. The remaining dormant assets are more dispersed: approximately 410,000 BTC are distributed across 550 large addresses (each address holding >100 BTC), and another approximately 110,000 BTC are held by nearly 20,000 small accounts. Quantum risk thus diverges into two categories: one is P2PK output from the Satoshi Nakamoto era, which carries the highest risk but is dispersed across a large number of small addresses; the other is a few high-value wallets (such as exchange cold wallets) whose public keys are exposed due to key reuse, which are more attractive to individual targets but can participate in migration more actively. Quantum risk also varies depending on the network's address structure, signature scheme, and governance model. As we have seen, Bitcoin's main risk exposure lies at the wallet and UTXO levels—traditional address types expose the public keys of some tokens, but its Proof-of-Work (PoW) mining mechanism and hash function are currently largely secure. In contrast, blockchains like Ethereum and Solana employ an account model. Under this model, the public key of the externally owned account (EOA) is fully exposed after a transaction is initiated, putting a larger proportion of the asset's value at risk, while in Bitcoin's UTXO model, many tokens are still hash-protected and address reuse is less common. Furthermore, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) chains like Ethereum and Solana face additional risks due to validators protecting the elliptic curve signatures used by the network. This makes governance and risk mitigation consensus key variables, and networks with different characteristics and degrees of decentralization will exhibit significant differences in the speed at which they adopt quantum-resistant upgrades.
7. Quantum-resistant proposals and migration paths
Bitcoin
The core of protecting Bitcoin from quantum threats lies in enabling quantum-resistant signatures and migrating tokens to secure address types. This involves the supply of "dormant" assets that are difficult to migrate, directly addressing the core contradiction in Bitcoin governance trade-offs. Currently discussed proposals include: