Author: YettaS Source: X, @YettaSing
Today I talked to an investor about how Monad, Stable, and Lighter didn't choose Binance Spot. The first two have stable FDVs within a relatively reasonable range, while Lighter's is slightly lower, probably because the selling pressure hasn't been fully absorbed yet. He asked me why? Actually, the project teams are already voting with their feet. The liquidity value on Binance and the cost of issuing tokens are a major trade-off.
After talking with some projects preparing for TGE, and others that have completed TGE for one to two years and are still working diligently, almost all teams share a similar feeling: TGE is a very painful learning experience. More importantly, many people have begun to question the necessity of this event itself.
Essentially, TGE is a marketing campaign, the biggest concentrated exposure in the company's history. Whether to do it, and when to do it, is a serious cost-benefit trade-off.
In essence, TGE is a marketing campaign, the biggest concentrated exposure in the company's history. Whether to do it, and when to do it, is a serious cost-benefit trade-off.
The costs are clearly visible: AirDrop was heavily dumped, liquidity was first drained by the CEX, and the token faced enormous selling pressure in a very short time. The benefits seem equally clear: attention, brand exposure, and so-called "early adopters." For a considerable period, the benefits did indeed outweigh the costs. This logic is best exemplified by the generic chain of the previous cycle. Public chains themselves didn't have ready-made products; they could only rely on tokens, higher performance, or grander narratives to first build a distribution advantage, then use this distribution capability to drive traffic to the ecosystem, and finally rely on real applications within the ecosystem to achieve user retention. However, the collective failure of almost all new public chains in this cycle also means that this path is becoming ineffective. Users have become more savvy, and more importantly, without a sustained influx of genuine liquidity into the industry, the costs and benefits of TGE have undergone a structural reversal. Several realities are now difficult to ignore. First, can we still truly acquire "early adopters" through tokens? In the Web2 era, earlier adopters were often more concerned with the product itself; however, in the current crypto context, earlier adopters are often more mercenary. Second, token-based cold starts may only be effective for the first project. Whether it's Plasma vs. Stable, or Hyperliquid vs. Lighter, subsequent players in the same field will quickly be diluted. Attention is diverted, but liquidity doesn't increase exponentially. Third, truly understanding the incentive structure of exchanges is crucial. Exchanges need to balance short-term profits and long-term ecosystem development, but their core objective remains transaction fees. For exchanges, more assets are better, but not every asset needs to be a "high-quality asset." This doesn't inherently align with projects' long-term development goals. In crypto, there are actually two products simultaneously: the token and the product itself. In the past, the path of "build the token first, then the product" worked; but now, it's gradually failing. Completing a TGE before the product is polished and PMF (Product-Market Fit) is confirmed makes the token more like a liability than an asset, and a significant one at that. Many projects only truly return to product, users, and long-term development after the TGE and after cleaning up the mess. But this process often excessively consumes the team's energy, morale, and time window. Anticipated development isn't free; the grander the narrative, the more it prematurely mortgages the future. What we are experiencing is a structural transformation from "valuation" to "value discovery." If ultimately we must pay such a heavy price—clearing all "historical debts" before we can truly begin construction—why not prioritize construction itself from the start? In this context, when would be a responsible choice for the project, users, and team to complete TGE? This contrast has become increasingly clear while reviewing some secondary market projects recently. Their paths are often more solid: finding a Product-Fulfilled Model (PFM), attracting users with the product itself, getting users to actually use it and generate revenue, and then using that revenue to buy back tokens. This process doesn't rely on emotions, narratives, or complex incentive designs, but it truly creates value continuously. Tokens are used to incentivize truly important people, and sufficiently healthy revenue begins to support the token's value. I don't believe this is the only correct path, nor do I believe TGE will completely disappear. Perhaps in some extremely competitive sectors with very short windows of opportunity, TGE remains the fastest way to dilute competitors' expectations and reshape the liquidity landscape; perhaps in scenarios with strong network effects, tokens can still amplify distribution efficiency. But these should all be choices made after clear weighing of options, not results driven by market trends. If this cycle has taught us anything, it might be that tokens are no longer inherently equivalent to growth, and narratives no longer automatically translate into value. The market is always right; this is a more mature, more ruthless, but healthier approach in the long run.