Can Bitcoin, which has no cash flow, become a high-quality asset?

In an interview on Natalie Brunell's podcast, Strategy Executive Chairman Michael Saylor stated that Bitcoin's recent flat price movement is a sign of strength, not weakness. The market is currently in a consolidation phase, with early holders gradually cashing out, while institutions are waiting for volatility to decrease before entering the market. The interview focused on "reconstructing the credit market with Bitcoin." He believes that the traditional credit market is "yield-hungry and lacks liquidity," while Bitcoin collateral can create stable cash flow without selling physical assets and can integrate Bitcoin into mainstream funding channels for credit and stock indices. The company will primarily use equity financing, supplemented by futures/options and other derivative instruments, to pay dividends, and seek ratings and inclusion in mainstream indices.

Disclaimer: This article is a video transcript published on September 19th, and some information may be outdated. The content does not constitute any investment advice and does not represent Wu Shuo's views or positions.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CbODA93ByS0&t=195s Why is Market Sentiment Towards Bitcoin Weakening Now? Michael Saylor: I believe that both macroeconomic conditions and community sentiment naturally ebb and flow. Bitcoin experiences periods of rapid rise and euphoria, when emotions are extremely ignited, adrenaline surges, followed by celebration and linear extrapolation (as if "landing on the moon"). Then the price retraces and consolidates, and many expect a rapid rebound, but instead, it trades sideways for a period. Human nature has a tendency to feel frustrated. But I don't think there's anything to be discouraged about. The fact is, if you zoom out and look at a one-year period, Bitcoin has risen by about 99%, almost doubling. If someone says they have a large position in an asset that has risen by nearly 100% in a year—should they be happy? Of course they should. It's just that the path to that is often more volatile. As for the reason for the recent sideways movement, I think it's largely because Bitcoin, with its market capitalization of about $2.3 trillion, is in a state of "unbanked," and many holders cannot obtain loans using BTC as collateral. When you hold a lot of Bitcoin but lack fiat currency and cannot borrow money, the only thing you can often do is sell your coins. Bitcoin currently resembles a "Magnificent 7" level startup, where employees are extremely wealthy on paper due to stock options, but unable to use them as collateral for loans, forcing them to sell. Outsiders might ask: do employees selling stock indicate a lack of confidence in the company? The answer is no—they simply need to send their children to college, buy houses, and support their parents. Therefore, the current selling pressure mainly comes from veteran crypto OGs (Original Guru), who are diversifying their positions by around 5% or similar operations. The market is digesting this selling pressure, strengthening support, and volatility is converging—which is actually a good sign. For an asset to mature, it needs more long-term capital (large corporations and institutions); early OGs who bought at a cost of $10 or even $1 are moderately cashing out to feel more secure; only after volatility decreases will very large institutions enter the market on a large scale. The paradox lies in this: when large institutions enter the market and volatility decreases, the market may feel "boring" for a period, the adrenaline will subside, and people's sentiment will turn bearish. But this is just a normal growth phase in the process of asset monetization. Can Bitcoin, which "lacks cash flow," become a high-quality asset? Natalie Brunell: I recently attended some events with TradFi practitioners, and their reasons for not allocating Bitcoin were almost identical: lack of cash flow; some financial institution employees were also prohibited from directly purchasing Bitcoin due to compliance issues. What are your thoughts on these concerns? From TradFi's perspective, what progress have we made? What changes are needed to get more people to embrace Bitcoin? Michael Saylor: I believe that many of the most important "property assets" in Western civilization—such as diamonds, gold, Old Master paintings, and land—do not generate cash flow. The same is true for many truly important things in our lives: marriage and children do not generate cash flow; real estate does not generate cash flow; the Nobel Prize does not generate cash flow; yachts and private jets also do not generate cash flow. Many things in the world that are generally considered "valuable" are not judged by cash flow. Moreover, as far as money is concerned, the "perfect money" should not have cash flow—the definition of money lies in high liquidity and strong salability. If you want something to act as money, it should not have too much "use value": for example, gold is more suitable as money than silver precisely because it has fewer industrial uses; once materials with high use value like copper and silicon are introduced, they become unsuitable as money. Some might say, "Without cash flow, it's not a good investment asset." This viewpoint has largely been formed over the past two generations. Since 1971, the mainstream global asset allocation concept has evolved into: long-term capital = a 60/40 bond-equity portfolio—bonds provide coupon payments, and equities provide dividends or profits; the world understands assets based on this. Ultimately, the S&P 500 became the dominant benchmark. If we look at index investing, approximately 85% of index funds are allocated to the S&P 500. When many people talk about "long-term capital," they think of funds used to preserve and grow their wealth through stock indices (such as the S&P 500 Index). Vanguard commercialized this concept, launching and popularizing the Vanguard 500 and the concept of index funds. When the idea of ​​"a fund composed of 500 constituent stocks" achieves extreme success, and S&P, Vanguard, and the entire mutual fund industry are built on this mindset, they are unlikely to immediately embrace a superior, disruptive new concept; they are more likely to be path-dependent. This is a practical issue. In an era where prices are denominated in US dollars, the US economy is continuously developing, the US dollar is the world's reserve currency, and there has been no global world war since the end of World War II (1945), you are in a specific environment at a specific point in time. In the language of differential equations, this is a particular solution obtained under given boundary conditions: if all boundary conditions are fixed, then substituting these numbers will give the corresponding answer; as long as these assumptions/boundary conditions are not changed, the solution holds. However, once the material changes from aluminum to steel (a metaphor for a change in external conditions), the original formula no longer applies. At this point, you can no longer use the particular solution; you must revert to the "homogeneous solution," no longer simply looking up formulas in tables, but deriving from first principles like a physicist would. In reality, most people never truly derive anything from first principles in their lifetime—they all use "partial solutions" provided by others. When the entire monetary system collapses, this method of "applying particular solutions" becomes ineffective. For example, in Lebanon, if your bank account is frozen and your currency becomes worthless; in some African countries; or in Argentina experiencing currency collapse—even if you hold assets with cash flow, they will be almost worthless in local currency. Ironically, assets traditionally considered "safe and cash-flow-generating" are far from safe when priced in the Nigerian Naira, Venezuelan Bolivar, Argentine Peso, Lebanese Pound, Iraqi Dinar, or Afghan Ni. The same applies to Russia before the ruble's dramatic devaluation in the mid-to-late 1990s. Those who cling to old ideas possess a "special solution" that only works within highly stable, closed systems. Such systems have neither undergone stress testing under external pressure nor truly faced the challenge of new ideas. Those who truly understand Bitcoin often come from extremely chaotic environments where their own currencies have collapsed, forcing them to think independently; or they are essentially first-principles thinkers—questioning everything like scientists and re-deriving the underlying logic. Therefore, the most ironic thing is that Vanguard's CEO said Bitcoin is not an investment because it has no cash flow; yet my company's largest shareholder is Vanguard. As Musk said: "The most ironic results are often the most likely to occur." What pain points do you see in the traditional fixed income field, and how can Bitcoin solve them? Michael Saylor: When you talk about the credit market, you'll find three characteristics. The first is mortgage-backed securities (MBS), with a collateral ratio of about 1.5 times and a yield of roughly 2%–4%. There is also fiat credit—backed by the government's promise that it can "continue to print money," which sets the so-called "risk-free rate." For example, Japan is around +50 basis points, Switzerland around -50 basis points, Europe around +200 basis points per year, and the US around +400 basis points per year, and recently it was lowered by 25 basis points. Furthermore, there's corporate credit, supported by a company's cash flow—whether it's a high-quality company like a "Magnificent Seven" (such as Microsoft and Apple), a high-yield bond (junk bond), or a struggling company. Its credit spread is roughly in the range of 50–500 basis points. For example, you might buy a corporate bond in Europe with an annual interest rate of 2.5%. But the real monetary inflation rate is often much higher. Therefore, Japan, Switzerland, Europe, and the United States are all in a state of financial repression to varying degrees: the nominal yield of so-called "risk-free" fiat currency assets is lower than the rate of monetary expansion and also lower than the rate of appreciation of scarce and popular assets. This is the first challenge. The second challenge is that these instruments have poor liquidity (somewhat similar to old-fashioned preferred stock), are difficult to trade, and sometimes do not trade for a long time, and are insufficiently collateralized. The credit market we observe is weak and unhealthy. For example, if you are in Switzerland and put your money in a bank and only get 0% or even have it deducted by 50 basis points, this situation is hard not to call a "yield famine." Many markets are eager to generate yield. Michael Saylor: On the other hand, in the venue where I gave a speech a few days ago, there were about 500 people. I asked, "Raise your hand if you have a bank account." Almost everyone did. But if I asked further, "How many of you have annualized returns exceeding 4.5% on your current account or savings?" almost none. Then I asked, "Would you be willing to accept an annual interest rate of 8-10% if your bank account offered that?" Everyone in the room said yes. But who offers such a long-term interest rate? Nobody. The opportunity we see in the market is this: unless you hold Bitcoin, own an asset that can store value for a long time (I call it digital capital), and are willing to hold it for 30-40 years, no one will give you a fair, long-term return. Tell me: who will give you 10% interest for the rest of your life? Your bank won't, companies won't, governments won't, and MBS issuers won't. Why is a 10% long-term interest rate difficult to achieve in the traditional system? Michael Saylor: The reason is that no company can reliably generate a return higher than 10% annually in a long-term, sustainable manner; and mortgage borrowers cannot afford such costs. Furthermore, stable governments are unwilling to do so; they prefer to pay you far less. Weak governments are forced to offer higher interest rates, but their monetary and political systems are often on the verge of collapse, so you can't find a reliable national borrower who can pay such rates long-term. You also can hardly find companies willing to do so—most companies' corporate finance strategy is not "issue more debt and manage it well," but rather "borrow less and buy back shares." We've discovered that Bitcoin is digital capital. Bitcoin's long-term appreciation outpaces that of the S&P 500. Once you acknowledge that Bitcoin's long-term appreciation outpaces the S&P 500, and my assumption for the next 21 years is a compound annual growth rate of approximately 29%, then you can use this type of appreciating asset as collateral to create credit. Bitcoin is digital capital that appreciates faster than the cost of capital; here, the cost of capital can be approximated by the long-term returns of the S&P 500. Credit issued against it is digital credit. This digital credit can have longer or shorter durations, can have higher yields, and can be denominated in any fiat currency because Bitcoin is stronger (scarceer, lower inflation). A key point in the credit market is that the currency in which debt is denominated should be weaker than the currency of the collateral you hold. If you denominate debt in a stronger currency but hold collateral with a weaker currency, you will experience a yield curve inversion and eventually go bankrupt. This is common in some countries where residents borrow in US dollars but repay with their local currency income, and when their local currency collapses, they ultimately go bankrupt. Therefore, we can choose to issue debt in relatively weaker currencies such as the Japanese yen, Swiss franc, euro, and US dollar. In this way, we can bear the risk of this currency while providing higher returns (similar to the coupon rates of distressed bonds), but with a collateralization ratio far exceeding that of US investment-grade companies—not 2–3 times, but 5 times, or even 10 times over-collateralization. Therefore, we can create credit instruments with lower risk, longer duration, and higher returns, and publicly issue (list) them with a quasi-perpetual structure to obtain better liquidity. In short, the goal is to provide a smarter, faster, and stronger credit product with better long-term liquidity, lower risk, and higher returns. For any Bitcoin treasury-type company, the opportunity lies in this: you possess the world's highest quality collateral—Bitcoin, which is digital capital. If you issue digital credit based on this, you can create the world's highest quality credit instruments. The volatility and returns derived from this credit will be transferred and amplified to the equity of common shareholders. So, on the equity side, you gain exposure to "amplified Bitcoin," while on the debt side, you "tame" Bitcoin into a low-risk, low-volatility, and yield-generating asset. What was previously considered "lacking cash flow" is now imbued with cash flow. Ironically, many investors who prefer traditional credit—those who only want to buy cash flow—will buy bonds, or even the stock of a loss-making company, even if its operating cash flow can't cover its interest payments, but they still emphasize "at least there's cash flow." What we're doing now is enabling Bitcoin to generate cash flow, turning it into a credit asset so it can be included in bond indices; simultaneously, creating equity exposure that can outperform, allowing it to enter stock indices. Both paths can continuously raise funds; they are both entry points for capital. Capital flows into the Bitcoin ecosystem through these entry points, and we then purchase Bitcoin, thereby providing funding and momentum for the Bitcoin network. What is perpetual preferred stock? What customizable terms does it offer compared to bonds and convertible bonds? Natalie Brunell: You pointed out the serious mispricing in capital markets: traditional collateral is often overvalued, while Bitcoin is undervalued. You saw an opportunity in this and launched a series of credit instruments—STRIKE, STRIDE, and now STRETCH. Let's elaborate: many people don't understand what preferred stock is. Although the name says "stock/share," in practice it's more like a credit instrument, even similar to a bond, offering returns. Could you explain the nature of preferred stock? Also, you're issuing perpetual preferred stock; what makes this structure unique in the market? Michael Saylor: Preferred stock is a second class of shares distinct from common stock. Common stock represents ultimate ownership of the company but typically does not have any special preference or guarantees. Preferred stock, on the other hand, can stipulate dividends: for example, fixed monthly or quarterly payments, or payments that fluctuate with the SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate), or fixed or monthly changes. You can include cash flow and income rights in preferred stock. Preferred stock can also have conversion clauses: for example, it can be converted into common stock at 1/10 or 1/5 of the share, or it can be fully convertible. You can set certain rights upside, certain income, liquidation priority, or even a higher priority and include guarantee clauses, such as cumulative preferred dividends—if we miss a payment, it accumulates; or stipulating penalties for missed payments—interest is charged for missed payments. In short, preferred stock is a versatile "container" into which you can include almost any type of terms you need. Natalie Brunell: And it's not debt, right? Unlike convertible bonds, it doesn't require principal repayment at maturity. You raise funds through preferred stock, but you don't need to repay the principal. Michael Saylor: Yes, it's generally different from debt instruments, which require principal repayment at a certain point in time. Of course, you can also make preferred stock resemble debt: for example, by giving holders a put option, requiring the company to repurchase it in cash; or by giving it a redemption right, making it look more like debt. Conversely, you can also make it more like equity: for example, non-cumulative preferred stock—the principal never matures, and even if distributions are suspended, no accrued interest or debt is generated (STRIDE is non-cumulative). Therefore, preferred stock can be adjusted across the entire spectrum from very debt-like to very equity-like, which is a very flexible security form for a publicly traded company. Michael Saylor: If you are a publicly traded company and hold a large amount of Bitcoin, you can design this security yourself and then publicly offer it. The first step of innovation is to "make" this tool; the second step is to list it—for example, by using a four-letter code (like STRC) for an IPO. The third step is: once publicly listed, you can also submit a shelf registration for it. This means that you might initially sell $1 billion at once, and then you can almost continuously increase the offering size, for example, by selling another $50 million every week; this is similar to how ETF shares increase with inflows—like IBIT growing, almost "daily subscriptions and daily expansion." Therefore, when you create a publicly traded, fully registered preferred stock, you are almost creating a "quasi-proprietary ETF." It combines the advantages of an ETF with the benefits of a proprietary asset—because you are creating this credit instrument in real time; rather than like a "junk bond ETF," which first collects funds from investors and then buys a bunch of other people's junk bonds on the market. ETF providers simply add a "shell" to other people's assets; but when you create a "digital credit instrument" as preferred stock, you are actually creating a native instrument, with its chain vertically connected to the underlying asset, Bitcoin. Natalie Brunell: Over-collateralization. Michael Saylor: Exactly. With this structure, you can design a preferred stock that is 10 times over-collateralized, yields 10% annualized dividends, and pays dividends perpetually. Once the terms are set, I can issue a certain size of product based on these conditions. What problems do Strike, Strife, Stride, and Stretch each solve? Michael Saylor: So far, we've designed four types of tools. The first one is called Strike. Its idea is to pay dividends at 8% of par value, with a par value of $100, and continuously pay 8% dividends; at the same time, it gives holders a conversion ratio—they can convert 1/10 of their shares into MSTR common stock. Thus, if MicroStrategy's stock price is around $350, this instrument effectively embeds approximately $35 of equity value. In other words, it offers both equity upside potential and downside protection through liquidation preference, while providing a continuous cash flow through dividends. From a design perspective, this type of instrument aims to achieve upside potential with minimal downside risk, while simultaneously generating returns during the waiting period. The second option is Strife (STRF), which offers a 10% dividend yield at par value. Simply put, you can think of it as a "long-term (even perpetual) high-yield note" with a par value of $100 and a 10% dividend payout. We also placed it at the highest level of our capital structure and stipulated in the covenant that no preferred stock with a higher priority than STRF would be issued, thus STRF would always be the highest-priority long-term credit instrument. This is important for risk-averse credit investors—because it means their principal is more strongly protected. This is a positive factor from a credit perspective and also enhances our credit rating in the eyes of investors. After our issuance, it traded at a price above par value, with a significant increase. The pricing logic is that as the company's credit improves, market acceptance of Bitcoin increases, and the price of Bitcoin rises, the price could potentially return from 85 (discount) to 100 (par value), then to 110, 120, 150, or even 200. Because it is a permanent instrument, it is entirely possible for it to trade at a premium for a long time, thus anchoring the company's cost of capital. In other words, if you were asking, "How should the market price the long-term (equivalent to 30 years) debt interest rate of a company with Bitcoin as its core asset and investment-grade credit?", the current market price would essentially provide the answer. The third option is Stride (STRD). Its design is based on Strife (STRF), but removes two provisions related to "penalty clauses" and "cumulative dividend clauses," keeping everything else the same. Thus, it still offers a "10% dividend/yield at par value," but its nature changes from senior long-term credit to subordinated long-term credit. The former is more like debt, with a higher tranche in the capital structure and lower risk; the latter is closer to equity, with a lower tranche and higher risk, only above common stock. After issuance, STRD traded with an effective yield of 12.7%; in comparison, STRF's effective yield was approximately 9%. Thus, a credit spread of 370 basis points appears between the two tiers of instruments: the "safest" and the "riskiest." Some might ask—and somewhat counterintuitively—why was Stride (STRD) issued twice the size of Strife (STRF) and more successful, even though it had no accrued dividend rights, no penalties, and was subordinated? The answer is simple: they believed in Bitcoin and trusted the company. At the same time, they wanted returns. If you put your money in an account, would you prefer 12.7% or 9% annualized return? The question becomes: do you trust the "bank" that holds your money? Once you trust them, and they offer you 12% instead of 9%, you'll naturally choose the former. Then who will trust the company? The shareholders themselves. Just like who would trust Bitcoin? Bitcoin holders. In the end, it's about what you choose to trust. These kinds of tools offer two core benefits: 1. First, it gives those who believe in the company and Bitcoin the opportunity to earn a 12.7% return, which is very attractive to them; 2. Second, it allows the company to continue building collateralized assets under senior instruments, which is credit positive: good for Strife, good for Strike, good for everything else. At the same time, it provides the company with a scalable way to leverage and buy Bitcoin, which itself has no counterparty credit risk. Theoretically, if the market can absorb $100 billion of Stride, we will issue $100 billion of Stride, increasing the company's leverage to 90%, and then buy Bitcoin. This is beneficial to Bitcoin and common stock; the rise in common stock will benefit Strike's "equity embedded portion." At the same time, because we buy a large amount of Bitcoin, it means that Strife's collateral will reach 50 times overcollateralization. So, this is beneficial to credit, convertible bonds, stocks, Bitcoin, and Stride holders—creating a flywheel effect. This is why we launched Stride. The last one is Stretch. Its starting point is: Many people say, "I want fixed income, like raising the bank interest rate from 5% to 10%, but I don't want volatility." I don't want the market price of my principal to fluctuate by $10. If I buy at $110 and it drops to $105 due to interest rate changes, it's equivalent to losing a year's worth of interest. Therefore, we hope to find a solution that anchors the price around the $100 face value, minimizes volatility, and allows for the extraction of returns. So, the core idea of ​​Stretch is: we don't want duration risk. Products like Stretch have a very long duration, equivalent to a 120-month interest rate duration, which causes the principal price to fluctuate significantly around the face value. In fact, for every 1% change in interest rates, if the underlying asset has a 20-year duration, the principal price could change by 20%. Therefore, we want to strip away the entire duration—not 120 months, but one month. When you strip away duration, you strip away volatility; after all, the volatility of a 30-year bond is far greater than that of a 1-month asset. We want to reduce volatility by stripping away duration. To do this, the product structure had to be changed to monthly instead of quarterly, so we changed the dividend to a monthly cash payment and introduced a floating monthly dividend yield. This is the first time in modern capital markets that a company has issued preferred stock with a "monthly floating dividend." We call it Treasury Preferred. This is something we invented based on AI—I designed it using AI. No one had thought of doing this before because there was no underlying asset that could support this design. However, Stretch isn't a "zero-volatility, high-interest current account," nor can it guarantee that if you deposit $1082.32 today, you can withdraw the exact same amount tomorrow. It's not quite there yet. But it's quite close: you can put in funds you need to hold for a year and receive a 10% dividend with extremely low volatility; if you need to withdraw your funds, you can sell them on the secondary market to redeem your principal. It's more like a Bitcoin-backed, money market-like instrument. Of course, it doesn't achieve the low volatility of a true money market fund, but its goal is to compete for the short end of the yield curve, backed by Bitcoin. If you promise not to sell Bitcoin, where does the Bitcoin-backed dividend funding come from? Michael Saylor: We currently have approximately $6 billion in preferred stock. We pay about $600 million in dividends annually. The company's enterprise value is approximately $120 billion, and we sell about $20 billion in common stock annually. So you can think of it this way: we basically sell the first $600 million of common stock to pay dividends; and the remaining $20 billion is used to buy more Bitcoin. In other words, we raise capital in the equity capital markets at an extremely fast pace. Only about 5% of the equity proceeds are earmarked for dividend payments; the rest is used to increase our Bitcoin holdings. In the event that we are unable to sell more stock for any reason, we already hold a large amount of Bitcoin and can also issue credit instruments or sell derivatives to cope. For example, we can sell Bitcoin derivatives—we can hedge by selling Bitcoin futures or selling out-of-the-money call options. Another method is called "basis trading," where you use your existing Bitcoin holdings as collateral to sell futures to hedge your position and earn basis profits. Therefore, the primary way companies pay dividends is by continuously selling common stock; a secondary method includes selling Bitcoin derivatives. Furthermore, the credit market is open to us, and we can access different credit markets for financing from time to time. Natalie Brunell: Is the goal to get these instruments credit ratings from mainstream rating agencies? What does that mean? Michael Saylor: Yes. Our current goal is to make the company the first Bitcoin asset repository to receive an investment-grade rating, and more broadly, the first investment-grade crypto company; at the same time, to get all the instruments we issue rated by rating agencies. This will require a lot of meetings and communication, but I am very confident that we will eventually achieve it. Why haven't we been included in the S&P 500 yet? Michael Saylor: The S&P 500 has a set of inclusion criteria, and we only met those criteria this quarter. We haven't met them for the past five years. You have to be profitable and meet a series of conditions. I think we only qualified after we adopted fair value accounting. The second quarter of 2025 will be our first qualifying quarter. We don't expect to be included in the S&P 500 on our first qualifying attempt. Tesla wasn't included on its first qualifying attempt either. We are a disruptive new company, and a disruptive new asset class. For a traditional committee that tends to be risk-averse and makes decisions about the flow of billions, hundreds of billions, or even trillions of dollars, waiting a few more quarters is perfectly reasonable. They might say, "Let's see what happens in the second quarter. If this business continues to show sustainability after two to five quarters..." Frankly, if someone adopts a new idea after four quarters of performance, that's already considered quite innovative and progressive. Often, people wait three to five years to acknowledge something. So I don't expect to be included in the first quarter. I believe we will only be included after several quarters, once we have established a track record that can be validated by the industry. In fact, S&P has already included Coinbase and Robinhood in its constituent stocks. I don't think they exclude the crypto asset class, or Bitcoin and digital assets. It's just that exchanges have existed for over a century; their history is longer and they are easier to understand. The so-called "Bitcoin Treasury companies" are a revolutionary new species that is rapidly emerging. I define the starting point for the entire Treasury company industry as November 5, 2024. Now, after about three quarters, it's very clear that this is a legitimate, compliant, and independent new type of company. This is also reflected in the market; in 12 months, the number of companies in the industry has grown from 60 to 185, and the industry is in a high-growth phase. Natalie Brunell: We have indeed grown to nearly 200 companies, but as you've seen, the premium for net asset value (NAV) is converging, and there's been some consolidation. Could you talk about the market reaction outside the Bitcoin community? Do they see Bitcoin Treasury companies as the "institutional" allocation of the future? How do they value these companies? Do you still see slow adoption? Will there be any catalysts to change that? Michael Saylor: I think the market is still in a learning phase. I just spoke with 25 investors, and I asked them: How familiar are you with this? For example, "Tell us about Bitcoin; will Bitcoin be banned?" — We really have to start from the beginning: there was no complete ban on Bitcoin in 2023. Then we have to go through the entire crypto industry, explain various credit instruments, and explain equity. Overall, most market participants are still catching up. To illustrate: imagine it's 1870, when people were just beginning to refine crude oil, and a wave of new companies emerged around the question, "What can oil do?" Then came the idea of ​​acrylic or polycarbonate (Lexan), followed by various petrochemical materials and products such as polyester, spandex, and nylon. Some talked about kerosene, others advocated for diesel or gasoline, and still others discussed asphalt. All the investors sat together asking: Is this really a good idea? How big will this industry be? They were still pondering "How large can the kerosene business be in 180 countries?" Incidentally, kerosene's first application was lighting—first for illumination, then engine fuel, then heating oil, then aviation kerosene, and now even rocket fuel. Therefore, I believe this industry is still extremely early. Companies are still learning how to explain what they are doing and deciding on their business models; investors are trying to understand these models and the industry; regulators are also dynamically evolving the rules—everything is happening in real time. This is a “digital gold rush.” In the decade from 2025 to 2035, a large number of different business models, products, and companies will emerge, making a lot of money and making a lot of mistakes, while also creating a lot of wealth—this is the noise and chaos of the market. In the context of public opinion and social division, what kind of “peaceful” coordination mechanism can Bitcoin provide? Natalie Brunell: Many people have been feeling heavy-hearted over the past week. This country seems more divided than ever before, with people attacking and tearing each other apart online. Do you have anything to say? Because you clearly find a lot of hope in Bitcoin, you always emphasize how it empowers individuals. Nothing benefits both the rich and the poor like Bitcoin does. I think we need a message of hope right now, especially in the aftermath of Charlie Kirk's assassination. Michael Saylor: The message I want to convey is: we have far more consensus among ourselves than the mainstream media makes you believe. Take the Bitcoin community, for example; there are often two opposing factions within it. When I'm online, the opinions can be very intense, colorful, and emotional; people get caught up in emotions and lash out at me; one group of developers can be furious with another. Ironically, we actually agree on 99.9% of the issues. When you delve a little deeper, you'll find that inflammatory content spreads more easily; rumors travel faster than the truth; and extreme stances spread more aggressively in cyberspace, on social media, and in the wider ecosystem. I've even noticed that during periods of peak company success, the amount of hateful and toxic information posted online is often the highest. I'll trace the accounts that post negative, hateful, and accusatory content. What I often see is: it's not a real person at all—never interacting with anyone, only about three hundred followers, and no shared interests with me. One more look, and you realize: it's a bot account. Many toxic and inflammatory online behaviors are actually forms of online guerrilla marketing. For example, someone shorting my company's stock might hire a digital marketing firm to generate bots to post malicious, sarcastic, and cynical content, creating the illusion of protest. The same applies to the political sphere: much "emotional mobilization" is actually paid online manipulators; people pay others to take to the streets and post online. Then, mainstream media focus their cameras on these paid protesters or fake bots, telling the cameras that "public sentiment is surging online" or "people are outraged in a certain place," pushing this message to millions of people, creating the appearance of social disorder and boiling public resentment. Unfortunately, when you amplify fake protests, a very small minority will inevitably be incited to violence, and the false becomes reality, leading to tragedy. I want to say to everyone that perhaps this is the warning that tragedy—the "Kirk incident"—brings us: There are indeed some dysfunctional mechanisms in society that specialize in "creating division," thriving by amplifying division. If we simply operate on these "megaphones of division" and turn them off, people can actually come together again—turn off the toxic megaphones. Another point is to learn to discern: if you read 37 negative comments, you might think everyone hates you. Online, I often feel that everyone hates everything I do; but back in the real world, I've never met a single person who expressed dissatisfaction to my face. You might ask: why do people offline seem happy, while those online appear so unhappy? The reason lies in the choice of camera angles. There's a saying: "Only bloodshed makes the headlines." Natalie Brunell: Yes, I know the news industry all too well. Michael Saylor: So the camera is always looking for "social unrest." But my view is: much of this unrest is "bought." Someone creates unrest in cyberspace and also in real life; then unhealthy media amplify and spread it. The public is actually experiencing aesthetic fatigue and becoming increasingly wary—this growing distrust of these systems is society's immune mechanism being activated. Overall, this will catalyze more positive behavior and constructive public participation. I am confident and optimistic: over time, we will move towards a healthier world and a healthier political community. But the premise is: don't blindly believe everything you're told, don't believe everything you read, and learn to think independently. Also, when you find a bunch of bot accounts amplifying toxicity on your timeline, don't interact with them. Just like when you see 52 people hired to protest on a street corner, don't argue with them—they're paid "mercenaries," and you can't convince them; they're paid to hold that view. We've seen similar scenarios in the crypto industry: when Greenpeace and the Sierra Club claimed "Bitcoin isn't environmentally friendly," you couldn't convince them either—this wasn't genuine discussion or feedback, but paid protest. I hope society can examine the consequences of paid protests and then take a step back and think about it. Natalie Brunell: Ultimately, Bitcoin is more like a peaceful revolution: it may defund power structures that profit from the "attention business" and shift value towards a more peaceful, more beneficial system for the masses. That's basically what I got from your idea that "Bitcoin brings hope." Michael Saylor: That's what we've always said: Bitcoin is a peaceful, fair way for us to resolve differences. As more people adopt it, peace spreads, fairness spreads, truth spreads, and toxicity fades.