Trump's plan to cut interest rates faces another setback as Wall Street analysts broadly expect the FOMC meeting Tuesday and Wednesday to keep rates unchanged — or potentially raise them — with Trump's own Middle East military policy identified as the primary factor limiting the Fed's room for cuts. CME FedWatch data shows approximately 68.5% of rate traders expect rates to remain unchanged this week, with the remaining approximately 31.5% pricing a 25 basis point hike to 3.75%-4.00%. US inflation currently runs at approximately 3.5% — slightly lower than May and June but significantly above the Fed's 2% target — with fuel prices 15.7% above year-ago levels as the ongoing Strait of Hormuz disruption keeps energy costs elevated despite a 4.9% decline between May and June. Bank of America chief US economist Aditya Bhave framed the dilemma precisely: not raising rates could damage the Fed's credibility in fighting inflation, while raising rates could conflict with Fed Chair Kevin Warsh's previous policy framework that favored observing the impact of supply shocks before acting.
The Credibility Trap — Warsh's Impossible Choice
The Bank of America framing captures the specific bind the FOMC faces at this week's meeting better than any other single analytical observation. Warsh has a prior framework favoring observation of supply shocks before tightening — a framework built on the principle that supply-side inflation driven by external shocks like oil prices is self-limiting and should not be addressed with demand-destroying rate hikes that create economic pain without resolving the supply-side cause. Applied to the current situation, that framework would argue against hiking into oil-driven inflation because higher interest rates will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
But the same framework confronts a credibility problem. Inflation at 3.5% — significantly above the 2% target — with fuel prices 15.7% above year-ago levels and no formal ceasefire agreement creating any visibility into when the energy price pressure will subside means the Fed has been holding rates while inflation runs hot for multiple consecutive months. At some point, continued inaction in the face of sustained above-target inflation becomes a de facto tolerance for higher inflation — which damages the Fed's credibility as an inflation fighter in a way that can be self-fulfilling: if the market believes the Fed will not hike to control inflation, inflation expectations rise, making actual inflation harder to control.
Bank of America has not resolved the dilemma in the Fed's favor: the firm expects a hold this week but forecasts 25 basis point hikes in September, October, and December — three consecutive hikes totaling 75 basis points, consistent with Capital Economics' forecast and validating the most hawkish credible scenario that the market has been pricing since the Hormuz escalation began.
The Inflation Picture — 3.5%, 15.7% Fuel, and the Warsh Inheritance
The current inflation readings provide the quantitative context for Warsh's credibility challenge. Headline inflation at 3.5% represents a slight decrease from the 3.8% June reading but remains 75% above the 2% target. Fuel prices running 15.7% above year-ago levels — despite falling 4.9% between May and June during the June ceasefire period — reflect the structural impact of 136 days of Hormuz disruption on US energy costs. The 4.9% May-June fuel price decline was the disinflationary gift of the ceasefire that made June's CPI reading the most constructive data point of the year. With Brent crude now rebounding from the $65 ceasefire low through $87-100 on the conflict's restart, July and August CPI will show fuel price reacceleration from the already-elevated 15.7% year-over-year baseline.
Warsh took office inheriting a Fed that had already been holding rates while inflation ran above target — making this week's meeting both a policy decision and a statement about his personal credibility framework. The market is explicitly watching his policy independence after taking office, with analysts warning that if the Fed avoids necessary rate hikes due to political pressure from Trump's public rate-cut demands, that political capitulation would itself damage the institution's credibility regardless of whether the inflation rationale justified a hold.
Trump's Middle East Policy as the Fed's Inflation Problem
Wall Street's identification of Trump's Middle East military and diplomatic actions as the primary factor limiting the Fed's room for interest rate cuts is the most politically charged analytical observation in the current monetary policy debate. The logic is precise: Trump's decision to continue strikes on Iran for 13 consecutive nights without a formal ceasefire agreement — combined with uncertainty surrounding Hormuz control and the Red Sea Houthi operations against Saudi ships — is the direct cause of the elevated oil prices that are keeping inflation above the Fed's target.
Trump wants rate cuts. But Trump's own military policy is producing the oil price inflation that is preventing the Fed from cutting rates. The administration cannot simultaneously escalate the Hormuz conflict and demand accommodative monetary policy — the two policy choices are in direct tension. Wall Street is making that tension explicit: the risks to oil prices and inflation are unlikely to completely subside without a formal ceasefire agreement, and without inflation subsiding, the Fed cannot credibly cut rates regardless of political pressure.
BofA's Three-Hike Forecast — September, October, December
Bank of America's expectation of three 25 basis point rate hikes — September, October, and December — totaling 75 basis points from the current 3.50%-3.75% range to 4.25%-4.50% by year-end is the most hawkish major bank forecast in the current cycle and represents the fullest expression of what sustained Hormuz disruption and above-target inflation would require from a credibility-focused Fed.
The market's current 10 basis points of July hike pricing that Bhave referenced — not 25 basis points but 10, reflecting a small probability of a 25bp hike rather than a certainty — means the market has already partially priced the Fed's discomfort without fully pricing BofA's three-hike baseline. This gap between the market's current 31.5% July hike probability and BofA's September-October-December certainty is the repricing risk that makes the FOMC's Wednesday communication so consequential: any language that moves the market from 31.5% toward BofA's certainty on the first hike would produce an immediate repricing across the yield curve, the dollar, and risk assets including Bitcoin.
The Bitcoin Implications — Three Simultaneous Fed Scenarios
The FOMC meeting presents Bitcoin with three distinct scenarios. In the 68.5% hold base case with dovish forward language — acknowledging oil as a transitory Hormuz shock and signaling data-dependence rather than a September hike bias — Bitcoin's structural support and the six-day $930 million ETF inflow streak provide the bid that could push prices through $65,000 toward $67,250. In the hold with hawkish language scenario — where Warsh signals concern about inflation persistence and validates September hike probability — Bitcoin faces the $63,000 Hathorn floor and the 200-week SMA at $62,873 as the immediate test. In the 31.5% July hike scenario — the tail risk that BofA's Bhave said has been partially priced — Bitcoin would face the most significant single-session macro shock since the April Liberation Day tariff announcement.
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